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S E C R E T GENEVA 000445

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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MORNING SESSION, JUNE 2, 2009

REF: A. STATE 50910

[1](#)B. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001)

[1](#)C. MOSCOW 1331

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-005.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2009
Time: 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the third meeting of the second session of the START Follow-on discussions, the Russian Delegation asked numerous questions they characterized as to help them understand the logic and the principles of the U.S. proposal for the "Elements" to be included in the START Follow-on Treaty (REF A). The majority of the questions dealt with Russia's continued objection to U.S. plans to deploy conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. They also stated that non-nuclear warheads should be included within the warhead limits of the new treaty. The Russian Delegation also expressed concern with U.S. statements about how reducing warheads under the START Follow-on Treaty could strengthen deterrence. In clarifying the U.S. intent, the U.S. Delegation explained that, in the U.S. view, both Sides must reduce strategic offensive arms (SOAs) in a way that reinforces strategic stability and strengthens deterrence.

The Russian Delegation also said that U.S. proposals were vague regarding limitations and associated verification for deployed missiles and questioned why the United States did not want to limit ICBMs and SLBMs.

14. (S) The Russian Delegation said Russia is open to format for the Presidential statements and suggested using the term "statement" as a convenient convention.

INTRODUCTION

15. (S) U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller welcomed the Russian Delegation to the U.S. Mission by complimenting them on their ability to provide Russia's "vision" for elements that should be included in a START Follow-on Treaty that were provided on the previous day (REF B). Although she did not agree with all of the elements, she recognized this positive achievement by the Russian Delegation. As for the work plan for the meeting, Gottemoeller suggested that the Russian Delegation provide its questions on the U.S. Paper on "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" that was delivered in Moscow (REF A), and perhaps the U.S. Delegation could provide some answers. Gottemoeller also said that the U.S. Delegation was ready to provide some initial questions to Russia's vision paper, but would be unable to provide a formal response during this session.

16. (S) Antonov agreed with Gottemoeller's suggested work plan, and stated that perhaps the approach of questions and

answers would help to develop some positive ideas. He also suggested that the Sides could exchange ideas on how to develop the draft statement by the Presidents for the July Summit. He said that Russia was open regarding the format for the report. It could either be a joint communique or an aide memoire, but he was more familiar with the use of the term "statement." He said that there should also be a discussion of how to format a report to the foreign ministers. Finally, he said that there was one other small technical issue that was raised in Moscow concerning the common work with Swiss authorities on the process of accreditation for the START Follow-on delegations; however, he was not prepared to discuss it because he did not have his papers with him.

RUSSIA'S QUESTIONS ON U.S.
PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A
START FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

17. (S) Antonov opened the discussion of the U.S. elements paper by stating that it was hard to understand the U.S. hybrid approach between the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty. He said that, in order for Russia to better understand the U.S. approach, it was important for Russia to ask questions. The discussion of the U.S. paper was not intended to oppose the positions contained in it; the Russian Delegation was merely trying to find commonality among the Russian and U.S. approaches. He said he wanted to understand the logic and principles in the paper as a necessary step before beginning the practical work of negotiating the new treaty.

18. (S) Antonov said that discussion of Russia's principal concerns on the U.S. paper would be based on technical issues that had been raised within the Russian Delegation and the discussion would only serve to provide Russia's initial response.

SECTION I - GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
AND OBJECTIVES, SUB-PARAGRAPH (E)

19. (S) Antonov said that his first question related to what

the U.S. meant by the phrase "strengthening deterrence" and what was its meaning for both sides. Antonov said that he did not understand the logic behind how it would be possible to strengthen deterrence on both Sides while reducing operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW). Gottemoeller explained that, as both Sides reduce the number of ODSNW, these reductions should not erode our capability to deter; reductions in nuclear warheads should not impact our mutual security. Antonov said that the concept sounded good but it was important that the wording convey the right meaning.

¶10. (S) Look said that Antonov had hit on a central feature of the U.S. proposal. The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to strengthen deterrence and as we reduce the number of nuclear warheads, the reductions must not weaken our ability to deter but strengthen it. During the Cold War, we talked about this in terms of strategic stability; as we reduce

nuclear weapons we strengthen stability. Look continued by saying that this is the philosophy of the first section of the U.S. paper and provides purpose for the new treaty. He went on to say that during the Cold War we were adversaries. The purpose of reductions during that time was to reduce the threat of war from the other side. Today, we are no longer enemies and we no longer have the threat of war against one another, thus we are seeking reductions under this new agreement based on a different purpose. As we do this, we need to keep in mind that it will be important to strengthen deterrence.

¶11. (S) Antonov said that he had mixed feelings on what Look had said; for the most part, Look seemed to have it right. He stated that the deterrence/nuclear warhead relationship is clear. He stated that, while he was not dismissing deterrence, it was his view that a new treaty that would establish a connection that would strengthen deterrence while reducing nuclear weapons did not make sense to him. He reiterated that we need to think about how our work towards reducing nuclear weapons to enhance strategic stability would be understood by the world as a positive signal of our commitments toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. Antonov said that we should examine this issue again later.

SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS
AND COUNTING RULES,
PARAGRAPH A: WARHEAD LIMIT

¶12. (S) Antonov stated that he would like the United States to clarify its proposal on warhead limits. He said the U.S. paper stated that there will be a "small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads...located at specified heavy bomber weapons storage areas." Antonov requested clarification of what the United States meant by "small number." Gottemoeller stated that the United States was studying this issue and would provide an answer at a later meeting.

¶13. (S) Antonov stated that the next question also dealt with warhead limits. He stated that the first bullet referred to a central limit on ODSNW. He wanted the United States to clarify what were the central limits on ODSNW and would there be some other type of limit on warheads? Gottemoeller said that the United States was continuing its work in Washington on clarifications to the U.S. approach to ODSNW, but the central limits to ODSNW would compare to the limits in the Moscow Treaty. Antonov said that his question seemed to have been misunderstood by the U.S. Delegation, so he promised to provide all questions in writing later.

SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS
AND COUNTING RULES,
PARAGRAPH C: COUNTING RULES

¶14. (S) Antonov said that the next question had to do with counting rules. He wanted to know why the United States proposed different counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Gottemoeller stated that dealing with heavy bombers

under START was complex and there were many different ways in which they were counted. In fact, some types of heavy bombers that carried only gravity bombs were counted with only one warhead. Under START, it was too complex to count the actual number of weapons on each heavy bomber. For this new treaty, in general, the United States is looking at new ideas for verification and transparency measures that will enhance our ability to count warheads. Warner added that, under the U.S. proposal, the actual number of warheads associated with deployed ICBMs and SLBMs can be counted on ballistic missiles, counting warheads on heavy bombers presents a different problem. Heavy bombers do not carry nuclear warheads day-to-day like they did when U.S. heavy bombers were maintained on "strip alert." Today, heavy bombers are not routinely armed. He said that this was another example of how the situation is different today regarding the relationship between nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. Gottemoeller stated that the United States would provide answers in writing and would provide a more detailed amplification of the U.S. ideas during the next session.

¶15. (S) In a follow-up question, Antonov asked whether the United States could explain and provide an example of what the United States meant by a "specified weapons storage area supporting heavy bomber air base." Again, Gottemoeller said that these descriptions and further analysis were being worked in Washington.

SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS
AND COUNTING RULES: LIMITS ON
DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS,
SLBMS, AND DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS

¶16. (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain why it had failed to include ICBMs and SLBMs in the limit on deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and on deployed heavy bombers. Gottemoeller responded that the Russian Delegation's question gets to the heart of the matter. She also wanted to thank Ambassador Strel'tsov for this question that was asked in Moscow (REF C). She stated that, based on this question, Section II of the U.S. elements paper was being worked in Washington and that the U.S. would have to get back to the Russian Delegation later.

¶17. (S) Regarding the first bullet of the same section and paragraph, Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain what it meant by the phrase "for ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon delivery." He stated that, under START, all ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers are subject to the treaty and are delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. He wanted to know if the United States had planned to test new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear armaments. Gottemoeller said that this was a question for the U.S. Delegation to take back to Washington.

¶18. (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain what it meant by the phrase "launchers that are no longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers that have been converted to non-nuclear only roles or could not be returned to operational status without considerable time and expense." He asked specifically what are the

criteria for converting launchers to this category and what does "considerable time and expense mean?" Antonov said that, for Russia, time was the critical factor. Gottemoeller noted that certain systems that are now derelict and non-functioning are still counted under START and that, since existing START elimination procedures are very expensive, neither Side has chosen to employ them to get old ICBM silo

launchers and heavy bombers off the books as long as they can be accommodated within the high START limits. Consequently, the United States was proposing to simplify the elimination process for such systems, a point that Antonov had earlier agreed with.

SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS AND
COUNTING RULES, PARAGRAPH D:
DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR WARHEADS

¶19. (S) Antonov challenged the validity of the U.S. statement that verification measures could be employed to distinguish non-nuclear/conventional warheads from nuclear warheads, but did so by asserting that the Russian Side knows of no verification procedures that would "guarantee" the identification of a non-nuclear warhead being carried by a ballistic missile that was in flight. Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain what he meant by "guarantee." Antonov said that Russia wanted 100 percent assurance that a missile in flight contained a conventional warhead. Gottemoeller stated that such assurance would normally be supplied through launch notifications and related measures. Warner said that any verification measures noted in the U.S. paper would be applied to warheads on ballistic missiles that were contained in their silo or SSBN launchers prior to any launch and not to the discrimination of ICBMs or SLBMs in flight. Antonov asked if the United States planned to maintain command and control of the possible launch of conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missiles at high levels comparable to those that would be used for nuclear-armed missiles. Warner answered that, if the United States developed such missiles, they would have robust command and control systems and launch authority would rest at the very highest levels of the U.S. Government.

¶20. (S) Gottemoeller stated that these types of systems were theoretical at this point and would require further discussion. Antonov stated that if these types of systems described by Warner were theoretical, then why should we consider non-nuclear warheads on strategic offensive arms. If such non-nuclear ICBMs or SLBMs have some deterrence value, then they should be considered as nuclear. Gottemoeller stated that the emphasis of non-nuclear warheads in the U.S. elements paper is based on results of discussions that have taken place in military strategies, military doctrine or other fora. Gottemoeller stated that the issues related to non-nuclear warheads will provide for interesting discussions as we continue our dialogue on this issue.

SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS
AND COUNTING RULES,
PARAGRAPH E: TERMINOLOGY

¶21. (S) Antonov asked the United States to explain why a term for "new type" was needed, given that the U.S. proposal did not contain limits on ICBMs and SLBMs. Gottemoeller stated that the Sides should return to this question during the afternoon meeting because the U.S. Delegation would present a similar question to the Russian Delegation regarding Russia's vision paper.

SECTION IV: ELIMINATION

¶22. (S) Antonov asked Gottemoeller to explain why the United States had only envisioned simplified elimination "procedures for silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers" and not other items that would be accountable under the treaty. Gottemoeller explained that these were only examples and that other items would also require elimination procedures.

SECTION V: NOTIFICATION,

MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

¶23. (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Side to explain which "basic START data exchanges, notifications, and inspection provisions, would be retained and adapted, as appropriate." Gottemoeller explained that many provisions would be retained while some would be adapted, when that appeared appropriate.

¶24. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian Paper containing Comments on the U.S. Documents Received During the First Round of Negotiations, dated June 1, 2009.

¶25. (U) Participants.

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Dr. Look
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov

Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Ubeev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
Mr. Lakeev (Int)

¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA